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Administrative Law in the Automated State 
Cary Coglianese* 
In the future, administrative agencies will rely increasingly on digital automation 
powered by machine learning algorithms. Can U.S. administrative law accommodate 
such a future? Not only might a highly automated state readily meet longstanding 
administrative law principles, but the responsible use of machine learning algorithms 
might perform even better than the status quo in terms of fulfilling administrative law’s 
core values of expert decision-making and democratic accountability. Algorithmic 
governance clearly promises more accurate, data-driven decisions. Moreover, due to 
their mathematical properties, algorithms might well prove to be more faithful agents of 
democratic institutions. Yet even if an automated state were smarter and more 
accountable, it might risk being less empathic. Although the degree of empathy in 
existing human-driven bureaucracies should not be overstated, a large-scale shift to 
government by algorithm will pose a new challenge for administrative law: ensuring that 
an automated state is also an empathic one. 
Because the future knows no bounds, the future of administrative law is vast indeed. In the near 
term, administrative law’s future in the United States will undoubtedly center around how the 
U.S. Supreme Court decides cases raising core administrative law issues such as the 
nondelegation doctrine and judicial deference to agencies’ statutory interpretation. But over the 
longer term, new issues will confront the field of administrative law as new changes occur in 
government and in society. One major change on the horizon will be a future in which many 
governmental tasks will be carried out by digital systems, especially those powered by machine 
learning algorithms, that will make up an increasingly automated administrative state.  
Administrative agencies undertake a range of activities—granting licenses, issuing 
payments, adjudicating claims, and setting rules—each of which traditionally has been executed 
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by government officials. But it is neither difficult nor unrealistic to imagine a world in which 
members of the public, when they interact with government, increasingly find themselves 
interacting predominantly with digital systems rather than human officials. Even today, the 
traditional administrative tasks for which human beings have long been responsible are 
increasingly augmented by computer systems. Few people in the United States today think twice 
about using government websites to apply for unemployment benefits, register complaints, or file 
paperwork, rather than visiting or telephoning government offices. The federal government has 
even created an online portal—USA.gov—that provides its users with easy access to the panoply 
of resources and digital application processes now available to the public via an extensive 
network of state and federal government websites.  
The transition to this online interaction with government over the last quarter-century 
portends what will likely be a deeper and wider technological transformation of governmental 
processes over the next quarter-century. Moving beyond the digitization of front-end 
communication with government, the future will likely feature the more extensive automation of 
back-end decision-making, which today still often remains firmly in the discretion of human 
officials. But we are perhaps only a few decades away from an administrative state that will 
operate on the basis of automated systems built with machine learning algorithms, much like 
important aspects of the private sector increasingly will. This will lead to an administrative state 
characterized by what I have elsewhere called algorithmic adjudication and robotic rulemaking.1 
Instead of having human officials make discretionary decisions, such as judgments about 
whether individual claimants qualify for disability benefits, agencies will be able to rely on 
automated systems to make these decisions. Claims-processing systems could be designed, for 
 
1 See Cary Coglianese and David Lehr, “Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-
Learning Era,” The Georgetown Law Journal 105 (5) (2017): 1147, 1171. 
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example, to import automatically a vast array of data from electronic medical records and then 
use an artificial intelligence system to process these data and determine whether claimants meet a 
specified probability threshold to qualify for benefits.2 
If many of the tasks that government currently completes through decision-making by 
human officials come to be performed entirely by automated decision tools and computer 
systems, how will administrative law respond to this transformation to an automated state? How 
should it?  
Most existing administrative law principles can already accommodate the widespread 
adoption of automation throughout the administrative state. Not only have agencies already long 
relied on a variety of physical instruments and machines that exhibit automaticity, but an 
automated state—or at least a responsible automated state—could be thought of as the 
culmination of administrative law’s basic vision of government that relies on neutral public 
administration of legislatively delegated authority. Administrative law will not need to be 
transformed entirely to operate in an era of increasing automation because that automation, when 
responsibly implemented, will advance the democratic and good governance values that have 
long underlay administrative law.  
Nevertheless, even within an otherwise responsible automated state, there will come to be 
an important ingredient of good governance that increasingly could turn out to be missing: 
human empathy. Even bureaucracies comprising human officials can be cold and sterile, but an 
era of extreme automation could present a state of crisis in human care—or, more precisely, a 
crisis in the lack of such care. In an increasingly automated state, administrative law will need to 
find ways to encourage agencies to ensure that members of the public will continue to have 
 
2 See Cary Coglianese and David Lehr, “Transparency and Algorithmic Governance,” Administrative Law Review 
71 (1) (2019): 1, 9. 
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opportunities to engage with humans, express their voices, and receive acknowledgment of their 
predicaments. The automated state will, in short, need also to be an empathic state. 
* * * 
The information technology revolution that launched several decades ago shows few 
signs of abating. Technologists today are both revealing and reaching new frontiers with the use 
of advanced algorithmic technologies variously referred to as artificial intelligence, machine 
learning, and predictive analytics. These terms—sometimes used interchangeably—encompass a 
broad range of tools that permit the rapid processing of large volumes of data that can yield 
highly accurate forecasts and thereby facilitate the automation of many distinct tasks. In the 
private sector, algorithmic innovations are allowing the automation of a wide range of functions 
previously handled by trained humans, such as the reading of chest X-rays, the operation of 
automobiles, and the granting of loans by financial institutions.  
Public administrators have taken notice of these algorithmic advances in the private 
sector. Some advances in the business world even have direct parallels to governmental tasks. 
Companies such as eBay and PayPal, for example, have developed their own highly successful 
automated online dispute resolution tools to resolve complaints without the direct involvement of 
human employees.3 Overall, government officials see in modern data analytics the possibility of 
building systems that could automate a variety of governmental tasks, all with the potential to 
deliver increased administrative efficiency, speed, consistency, and accuracy.  
The vision of an automated administrative state might best be exemplified today by 
developments in the Republic of Estonia, a small Baltic country that has thoroughly embraced 
digital government as a mark of distinction. The country’s e-Estonia project has transformed the 
 
3 See Benjamin H. Barton and Stephanos Bibas, Rebooting Justice: More Technology, Fewer Lawyers, and the 
Future of Law (New York: Encounter Books, 2017), 111–115. 
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nation’s administration by digitizing and securely storing vast amounts of information about 
individuals, from their medical records to their employment information to their financial 
statements.4 That information is cross-linked through a digital infrastructure called X-Road, so 
that a person’s records can be accessed instantly by any entity that needs them, subject to limits 
intended to prevent wrongdoing. This widespread digitization has facilitated the automation of a 
range of government services: individuals can easily vote, apply for a loan, file their taxes, and 
complete other administrative tasks without ever needing to interact with a human official, 
simply by transferring their digital information to complete forms and submit requests. By 
automating many of its bureaucratic processes, Estonia has saved an estimated 2 percent of its 
GDP each year. The country is even exploring the use of an automated “judge” to resolve small 
claims disputes.5 
Other countries such as Denmark and South Korea are also leading the world in the 
adoption of so-called e-government tools.6 The United States may not have yet achieved quite 
the same level of implementation of automated government, but it is certainly not far behind. 
Federal, state, and local agencies throughout the United States have not only embraced web-
based applications—such as those compiled on the USA.gov website—but have begun to deploy 
the use of machine learning algorithms to automate a range of administrative decision-making 
processes. In most of these cases, human officials remain involved to some extent, but a 
 
4 See Nathan Heller, “Estonia, the Digital Republic,” The New Yorker, December 11, 2017, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/18/estonia-the-digital-republic; and Republic of Estonia, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communications, Report of Estonia’s AI Taskforce (Tallinn: Republic of Estonia, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communications, 2019), https://f98cc689-5814-47ec-86b3-
db505a7c3978.filesusr.com/ugd/7df26f_486454c9f32340b28206e140350159cf.pdf. 
5 See Eric Niler, “Can AI Be a Fair Judge? Estonia Thinks So,” Wired, March 25, 2019, 
https://www.wired.com/story/can-ai-be-fair-judge-court-estonia-thinks-so/. 
6 See United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, E-Government Survey 2020: Digital Government 




significant amount of administrative work in the United States is increasingly conducted through 
digital systems. 
Automation helps federal, state, and local governments navigate challenging resource-
allocation decisions in the management of public programs. Several states have implemented 
algorithmic tools to help make decisions about the award of Medicaid and other social benefits, 
seeking to speed up and improve the consistency of claims processing.7 Similarly, the federal 
Social Security Administration uses automated tools to help support human appeals judges’ 
efforts to provide quality oversight of an agency adjudicatory process that handles as many as 2.5 
millions disability benefits claims each year.8  
Municipalities rely on automated systems when deciding where to send health and 
building inspectors.9 Some local authorities use such systems when making choices about where 
and when to deploy social workers to follow up on allegations of child abuse and neglect.10 
Federal agencies, meanwhile, have used algorithmic systems to analyze consumer complaints, 
process reports of workplace injuries, and evaluate public comments on proposed rules.11 
 
7 See Cary Coglianese and Lavi M. Ben Dor, “AI in Adjudication and Administration,” Brooklyn Law Review 86 
(forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3501067. 
8 See David Freeman Engstrom, Daniel E. Ho, Catherine M Sharkey, and Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Government 
by Algorithm: Artificial Intelligence in Federal Administrative Agencies (Washington, D.C.: The Administrative 
Conference of the United States, 2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-
Report.pdf. 
9 See Gabe Cherry, “Google, U-M to Build Digital Tools for Flint Water Crisis,” University of Michigan News, 
May 3, 2016, http://ns.umich.edu/new/multimedia/videos/23780-google-u-m-to-build-digitaltools-for-flint-water-
crisis; City of Chicago, “Food Inspection Forecasting: Optimizing Inspections with Analytics,” 
https://chicago.github.io/food-inspections-evaluation/ (accessed November 21, 2020); Robert Sullivan, “Innovations 
in Identifying People Who Frequently Use Criminal Justice and Healthcare Systems,” Policy Research Associates, 
May 16, 2018, https://www.prainc.com/innovations-identification-cj-healthcare/; Harvard Kennedy School, “Data-
Smart City Solutions, A Catalogue of Civic Data Use Cases: How Can Data and Analytics Be Used to Enhance City 
Operations?” October 9, 2019, https://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/how-can-data-and-analytics-be-used-
to-enhance-city-operations-723; and University of Pennsylvania, “Uses in Government,” 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/ppr/optimizing-government-project/government.php#municipal (accessed 
November 21, 2020). 
10 Dan Hurley, “Can an Algorithm Tell When Kids Are in Danger?” The New York Times, January 2, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/magazine/can-an-algorithm-tell-when-kids-are-indanger.html. 
11 See Coglianese and Ben Dor, “AI in Adjudication and Administration.”. 
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Criminal law enforcement agencies throughout the United States also rely on various 
automated tools. They have embraced tools that automate deployment of officer patrols based on 
predictions of locations in cities where crime is most likely to occur.12 Many law enforcement 
agencies have also widely used automated facial recognition tools to facilitate suspect 
identification or for security screenings.13  
Regulatory agencies similarly have deployed automated tools for targeting auditing and 
enforcement resources. States have employed data analytics to detect fraud and errors in their 
unemployment insurance programs.14 The federal Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
Internal Revenue Service have adopted algorithmic tools to help detect fraudulent behavior and 
other wrongdoing.15  
In these and other ways, public authorities across the United States have already made 
considerable strides toward an increasingly automated government. Over the next several 
decades, governmental use of automation driven by artificial intelligence tools will surely spread 
still further and is likely to lead to the transformation of or phasing out of many jobs currently 
performed by government employees.16 The future state that administrative law will govern will 
be one of increasingly automated administration. 
 
12 See Tim Lau, “Predicting Policing Explained,” Brennan Center for Justice, April 1, 2020, 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/predictive-policing-explained. 
13 See Shirin Ghaffary and Rani Molla, “Here’s Where the U.S. Government Is Using Facial Recognition 
Technology to Surveil Americans,” Vox, December 10, 2019, 
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/7/18/20698307/facial-recognition-technology-us-government-fight-for-the-
future. 
14 See Tod Newcombe, “Aiming Analytics at Our $3.5 Billion Unemployment Insurance Problem,” Government 
Technology, March 2017, https://www.govtech.com/data/Aiming-Analytics-at-Our-35-Billion-Unemployment-
Insurance-Problem.html. 
15 See David Freeman Engstrom and Daniel E. Ho, “Algorithmic Accountability in the Administrative State,” Yale 
Journal on Regulation 37 (3) (2020): 800, 815–819; and Richard Rubin,” AI Comes to the Tax Code,” The Wall 
Street Journal, February 26, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ai-comes-to-the-tax-code-11582713000. 
16 Partnership for Public Service and IBM Center for the Business of Government, More Than Meets AI: Assessing 
the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on the Work of Government (Washington, D.C.: Partnership for Public Service 
and IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2019), https://ourpublicservice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/More-Than-Meets-AI.pdf. 
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* * * 
Can administrative law accommodate an automated state? At first glance, the prospect of 
an automated state might seem to demand a fundamental rewriting of administrative law. After 
all, administrative law developed to constrain the discretion of human officials, to keep their 
work within the bounds of the law and to prevent the kinds of principal-agent problems that can 
arise in the relationships between human decision-makers. Moreover, one of administrative law’s 
primary tenets—that governmental processes should be transparent and susceptible to reason-
giving—would seem to stand as a barrier to the deployment of the very machine learning 
algorithms that are driving the emerging trends in automation.17 That is because machine 
learning algorithms—sometimes referred to as “black box” algorithms—have properties that can 
make them opaque and hard to explain. Unlike traditional statistical algorithms, in which 
variables are selected by humans and resulting coefficients can be pointed to as explaining 
specified amounts of variation in a dependent variable, learning algorithms effectively discover 
their own patterns in the data and do not generate results that associate explanatory power to 
specific variables. Data scientists can certainly understand and explain the goals and general 
properties of machine learning algorithms, but overall these algorithms have a degree of 
autonomy—hence their “learning” moniker—that can make it more difficult to explain precisely 
why they reach any specific forecast that they do. They do not usually provide any basis for the 
kind of causal statements often used to justify administrative decisions (such as “X is justified 
because it causes Y”).  
As a result, transparency concerns are reasonable ones to contemplate when considering a 
future of an automated state based on machine learning systems. But on even a modest degree of 
 
17 Such tenets are reflected in both the notion of due process as well as the general standard that agency action 
should not be arbitrary and capricious. 
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additional reflection, these concerns would appear neither to act as any intrinsic barrier to the 
reliance on machine learning automation nor necessarily to demand any fundamental 
transformation of U.S. administrative law to accommodate an automated state. Administrative 
law has never demanded anything close to absolute transparency nor required meticulous or 
exhaustively detailed reasoning, even under the arbitrary and capricious standard of Section 706 
of the Administrative Procedure Act.18 Administrative agencies that rely on machine learning 
systems should be able to satisfy any reason-giving obligations under existing legal principles by 
explaining in general terms how the algorithm was designed to work and demonstrating that it 
has been validated to work as designed by comparing its results to those generated by the status 
quo process. An adequate explanation could involve merely describing the type of algorithm 
used, disclosing the objective the algorithm was established to meet, and showing how the 
algorithm processed a certain type of data to produce results that were shown to meet the 
algorithm’s defined objective as well as or better than current processes.  
Such an explanation would, in effect, mirror the kinds of explanations that administrators 
currently offer when they rely on physical rather than digital machines. For example, in 
justifying the imposition of an administrative penalty on a food processor for failing to store 
perishable food at a cool temperature, an administrator need not be able to explain exactly how a 
thermometer works, just that it reports temperatures accurately. Courts have long treated 
instrument validation for physical machines as a sufficient basis for agency actions grounded on 
such instruments. Moreover, they have typically deferred to administrators’ expertise in cases in 
which government officials have relied on complex instruments or mathematical analyses. In 
fact, the U.S. Supreme Court in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense 
 
18 See Coglianese and Lehr, “Transparency and Algorithmic Governance,” 26–29. 
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Council called upon courts to be their “most deferential” when an administrative agency is 
“making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science.”19 More 
recently, the Supreme Court noted in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resource Council that whenever 
an agency decision “‘requires a high degree of technical expertise,’ we must defer to ‘the 
informed discretion of the responsible agencies.’”20 Lower courts have followed these 
instructions and have upheld agencies’ reliance on complex (even if not machine learning) 
algorithms in various contexts.  
It is difficult to see the Supreme Court gaining any more confidence in judges’ ability to 
provide independent technological assessments when technologies and statistical techniques 
grow still more complex in an era of machine learning. Unless the Court should gain a new 
source of such confidence and abandon the postures it took in Baltimore Gas & Electric and 
Marsh, nothing in administrative law’s reason-giving requirements would seem to serve as any 
insuperable barrier to administrative agencies’ more extensive reliance on systems based on 
machine learning or other advanced predictive techniques, even if they are properly 
characterized today as black-box algorithms. That portrayal of machine learning algorithms as a 
black box also appears likely to grow less apt in the coming decades, as data scientists are 
currently working extensively to develop advanced techniques that can explain better the outputs 
such complex algorithms generate.21 Advances in “explainable” artificial intelligence techniques 
likely will only make automation still more compatible with long-standing administrative law 
values.  
 
19 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). 
20 490 U.S. 360, 371 (2011), quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976). 
21 See Coglianese and Lehr, “Transparency and Algorithmic Governance,” 49–55. 
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Of course, all of this is not to say that agencies will or should always receive deference 
for how they design or operate their systems. Under the standard articulated in Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Insurance Co., agencies will still need to provide basic 
information about the purposes behind their automated systems and how they generally 
operate.22 They will need to show that they have carefully considered key design options. And 
they will likely need to demonstrate through accepted auditing and validation efforts that these 
systems do operate to produce results as intended.23 But all this is to say that it will almost 
certainly be possible for agencies to provide the necessary information to justify the outcomes 
that their systems produce. In other words, longstanding administrative law principles seem 
ready and fit for an automated age.  
* * * 
In important respects, a shift to automated administration could even be said to represent 
something of an apotheosis of the principles behind administrative law. Much of administrative 
law has been focused on the potential problems created by the discretion that human officials 
exercise under delegated authority. By automating administration, those problems can be 
mitigated, and the control of human discretion may be enhanced by the literal hardwiring of 
certain governmental tasks.  
Automation can advance two major themes that have long characterized much of U.S. 
administrative law: one theme centers on keeping the exercise of administrative authority 
democratically accountable, while the other seeks to ensure that such authority is based on sound 
 
22 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
23 Validation, which should take place before abandoning the status quo of a human-based process, could involve 
testing the algorithm on randomly selected cases that are also, in tandem, decided by humans following normal 
procedures. Closer scrutiny could be provided by panels of human experts of discrepancies between the results of 
digital systems and the initial human decision-makers. 
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expert judgment. The reason-giving thrust behind the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary 
and capricious standard, for example, reflects both of these themes. Reasoned decision-making 
provides a basis for helping ensure that agencies both remain faithful to their democratic 
mandates and base their decisions on sound evidence and analysis. Likewise, the institutionalized 
regimen of White House review of prospective regulations both facilitates greater accountability 
to a democratically elected president and promotes expert agency decision-making through the 
benefit-cost analysis that it calls on agencies to conduct.24  
In the same vein, in approving judicial deference to agencies’ statutory interpretations, it 
is little accident that the Supreme Court’s widely cited decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council stressed both reasons of democratic accountability and substantive expertise.25 
It highlighted how agencies are situated within “political branch of the Government” as well as 
how they simultaneously possess “great expertise”—and thus are better suited than courts to 
make judgments about the meaning of ambiguous statutory terms.26 Although the future of the 
Chevron doctrine itself appears uncertain at best, the Court’s underlying emphasis on 
accountability and expertise is unlikely to disappear, as they are inherent qualities of 
administrative governance.  
Both qualities can be enhanced by machine learning and automation. It is perhaps most 
obvious that automation can contribute to the goal of expert administration. When automated 
systems will improve the accuracy of agency decision-making—which is what makes machine 
learning and other data analytic techniques look so promising—this will necessarily promote 
 
24 This regulatory review regimen is outlined in Executive Order 12,866. 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (October 4, 1993). 
25 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As a formal matter, the Court grounded Chevron deference in an explicit or implicit 
delegation of clarifying or gap-filling authority to the agency. See Cary Coglianese, “Chevron’s Interstitial Steps,” 
The George Washington Law Review 85 (5) (2017): 1339, 1347-1351. 
26 467 U.S. 837, 865. 
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administrative law’s goal of enhancing agency expertise. Artificial intelligence promises to 
deliver the state of the art when it comes to expert governing. When the Veterans Administration 
(VA), for example, recently opted to rely on an automated algorithmic system to predict which 
veterans are at a higher risk of suicide (and thus in need of more urgent care), it did so because 
this analytic system was smarter than even experienced psychiatrists.27 “The fact is, we can’t rely 
on trained medical experts to identify people who are truly at high risk [because they are] no 
good at it,” noted one VA psychiatrist.28 
Likewise, when it comes to administrative law’s other main goal—democratic 
accountability—automated systems can also advance the ball. The democratic advantages of 
automation may seem counterintuitive at first: machine-based governance would hardly seem 
consistent with a Lincolnesque notion of government by “the people.” But the reality is that 
automated systems themselves still demand people who can design, test, and audit such systems. 
As long as these human designers and overseers operate systems in a manner consistent with the 
parameters set out for an agency in its governing statute, automated systems themselves can 
prevent the kind of slippage and shirking that can occur when agencies must rely on thousands of 
human officials to carry out major national programs and policies. Even when it comes to 
making new rules under authority delegated to it by Congress, agencies could very well find that 
automation promotes democratic accountability rather than detracts from it. Some level of 
accountability will be demanded by the properties of machine learning algorithms themselves. 
To function, these algorithms depend not merely on an “intelligible principle” to guide them; 
 




they need a principle that can be precisely specified in mathematical terms.29 In this way, 
automation could very well drive the demand for still greater specification and clarity in statutes 
about the goals of administration, more than even any potential judicial reinvigoration of the 
nondelegation doctrine might produce. 
Although oversight of the design and development of automated systems will remain 
important to ensure that they are created in accord with democratically affirmed values, once 
operating, they should pose far fewer opportunities for the kinds of problems, such as capture 
and corruption, that administrative law has long sought to prevent. Unlike human beings, who 
might pursue their own narrow interests instead of those of the broader public, algorithms will be 
programmed to optimize the objectives defined by their designers. As long as those designers are 
accountable to the public, and as long as the system objectives are defined in non-self-interested 
ways that comport with relevant legislation, then the algorithms themselves pose no risk of 
capture and corruption. In an important sense, they will be more accountable in their execution 
than even human officials can be when it comes to implementing law. 
This is not to suggest that automated systems will amount to a panacea nor that their 
responsible development and use will be easy. They can certainly be used in legally and morally 
problematic ways. Furthermore, their use by agencies will still be subject to constraints beyond 
administrative law—for instance, legal constraints under the First Amendment or the Equal 
Protection Clause—that apply to all governmental actions. In fact, equality concerns raised by 
the potential for algorithmic bias may well become the most salient legal issue that automated 
systems will confront in the coming years. Bias obviously exists with human decision-making, 
but it also is a concern with machine learning algorithms, especially when the underlying data 
 
29 For a discussion of the intelligible principle doctrine, see Cary Coglianese, “Dimensions of Delegation,” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 167 (7) (2019): 1849. 
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used to train these algorithms already contain (human-created) biases. Nevertheless, absent an 
independent showing of animus, automated systems based on machine learning algorithms may 
well withstand scrutiny under equal protection doctrine, at least if that doctrine does not change 
much over time.30  
Governmental reliance on machine learning algorithms would be able to avoid actionable 
conduct under equal protection analysis even if an administrator elected to use data that included 
variables on race, gender, or other protected classifications. As long as the objective the 
algorithm is programmed to achieve is not stated in terms of such protected classifications, it will 
be hard, if not impossible, to show that the algorithm has used any class-based variables as a 
determinative basis for any particular outcome. The outcomes these algorithms generate derive 
from effectively autonomous mathematical processes that discern patterns among variables and 
relationships between different variables. Presumably, machine learning algorithms will seldom 
if ever support the kind of clear and categorical determinations based on class-related variables 
that the Supreme Court has rejected, where race or other protected classes have been given an 
explicit and even dispositive weight in governmental decisions.31 Even when used with data on 
class variables, the use of machine learning algorithms might well even lead to better outcomes 
for members of a protected class overall.32  
Moreover, with greater reliance on algorithm-based automated systems, governments will 
have a new ability to reduce undesired biases by making mathematical adjustments to their 
 
30 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).  
31 See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); and Coglianese and Lehr, “Regulating by Robot.”  
32 For an accessible account of technical aspects of algorithmic fairness, see Michael Kearns and Aaron Roth, The 
Ethical Algorithm: The Science of Socially Aware Algorithm Design (New York: Oxford, 2019), 57-93. For a cogent 
discussion of how digital algorithms can generate results more fair than human processes, see Sandra G. Mayson, 
“Bias In, Bias Out,” Yale Law Journal 128 (8) (2019): 2218, 2277-2281. 
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algorithms, sometimes without much loss in accuracy.33 Such an ability will surely make it easier 
to tamp out biases than it currently is to eliminate humans’ implicit biases. In an automated state 
of the future, government may find itself less prone to charges of undue discrimination.  
For these reasons, it would appear that longstanding principles of administrative law, and 
even constitutional law, will likely continue to operate in an automated state, encouraging 
agencies to act responsibly by both preserving democratic accountability and making smarter, 
fairer decisions. This is not to say that existing principles will remain unchanged. No one should 
expect that any area of the law will stay static over the long term. Given that some scholars and 
observers have already come to look critically upon governmental uses of algorithms, perhaps 
shifting public attitudes will lead to new, potentially more demanding administrative law 
principles specifically targeting the automated features of the future administrative state.34  
Although we should have little doubt that norms and best practices will indeed solidify 
around how government officials ought to use automated systems—much as they have 
developed over the years for the use of other analytic tools, such as benefit-cost analysis—it is 
far from clear that the fundamentals of administrative law will change dramatically in an era of 
algorithmic governance.35 Judges, after all, will confront many of the same difficulties 
scrutinizing machine learning algorithms as they have confronted in the past with respect to other 
 
33 See, for example, Richard A. Berk and Arun Kumar Kuchibhotla, “Improving Fairness in Criminal Justice 
Algorithmic Risk Assessments Using Conformal Prediction Sets,” (2021), arXiv:2008.11664 [stat.AP]; James E. 
Johndrow and Kristian Lum, “An Algorithm for Removing Sensitive Information: Application to Race-Independent 
Recidivism Prediction,” The Annals of Applied Statistics 13 (1) (2019): 189; and Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, 
Sendhil Mullainathan, and Cass R. Sunstein, “Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms,” Journal of Legal Analysis 
10 (2018): 113. 
34 See, for example, Danielle Keats Citron, “Technological Due Process,” Washington University Law Review 85 (6) 
(2008): 1249; Karen Yeung, “Algorithmic Regulation: A Critical Interrogation,” Regulation and Government 12 (4)  
(2018): 505. 
35 For example, norms will surely develop about how agencies should document their choices in designing 
algorithmic systems. See, for example, Timnit Gebru, Jamie Morgenstern, Briana Vecchione, et al., “Datasheets for 
Datasets” (2020), https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09010.  
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statistical and technical aspects of administration, which may lead to continued judicial 
deference as exemplified in Baltimore Gas & Electric.36 In addition, rather than public attitudes 
turning against governmental use of algorithmic tools, it may just as easily be expected that 
public expectations will be shaped by widespread acceptance of artificial intelligence in other 
facets of life, perhaps even leading to affirmative demands that governments use algorithmic 
tools rather than continuing to rely on slower or less reliable processes. Cautious about ossifying 
algorithmic governance, judges and administrative law scholars might well resist the urge to 
impose new doctrinal hurdles on automation.37 They may also conclude, as would be reasonable, 
that existing doctrine contains what is needed to ensure that government agencies use automated 
systems responsibly.   
As a result, if government agencies wish to expand the responsible use of properly 
trained, audited, and validated automated systems that are sufficiently aligned with legislative 
mandates and improve agencies’ ability to perform key tasks, it seems they will hardly need any 
transformation of traditional administrative law principles to accommodate these innovations. 
Nor will administrative law need to adapt much, if at all, to ensure that kind of responsible use of 
algorithmic governance. Overall, an automated state could conceivably do a better job than ever 
before of fulfilling the vision of good governance that has long animated administrative law. 
* * * 
 
36 Channeling Voltaire, if Baltimore Gas & Electric did not exist, courts might still find it necessary to invoke it. See 
Adrian Vermeule, Law’s Abnegation: From Law’s Empire to the Administrative State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2016). 
37 As Steven Appel and I have noted elsewhere, “it is not hard to imagine a time in the near future when the public 
actually comes to expect their public servants to rely on such technologies. As complex machine-learning algorithms 
proliferate in the private sector, members of the public may well come to expect similar accuracy and automated 
services from their governments.” Steven M. Appel and Cary Coglianese, “Algorithmic Governance and 
Administrative Law,” in Cambridge Handbook on the Law of Algorithms: Human Rights, Intellectual Property, 
Government Regulation, ed. Woodrow Barfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 162, 165. 
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Still, even if the prevailing principles of administrative law can deal adequately with 
public sector use of machine learning algorithms, something important could easily end up 
getting lost in an automated state. Such an administrative government might be smarter, more 
democratically accountable, and even more fair. But it could also lack feeling, even more than 
sterile bureaucratic processes do today. Interactions with government through smartphones and 
automated chats may be fine for making campground reservations at national parks or even for 
filing taxes. But they run the risk of leaving out an important ingredient of good governance—
namely, empathy—in those circumstances in which government must make highly consequential 
decisions affecting the well-being of individuals. In such circumstances, empathy demands that 
administrative agencies provide opportunities for human interaction and for listening and 
expressions of concern. An important challenge for administrative law in the decades to come 
will be to find ways to encourage an automated state that is also an empathic state. 
A desire for empathy, of course, need not impede the development of automation.38 If 
government manages the transition to an automated state well, it is possible that automation can 
enhance the government’s ability to provide empathy to members of the public, but only if 
government officials are sufficiently attentive to the need to do so. This need will become even 
greater as the overall economy moves toward greater reliance on artificial intelligence and other 
automated systems. Society will need to value and find new ways to fulfill those tasks involving 
empathy that humans are good at fulfilling. The goal should be, as technologist Kai-Fu Lee has 
 
38 Notably, technologists are even exploring the possibility of building empathy into automated tools. See, for 
example, Pascale Fung, Dario Bertero, Yan Wan, et al., “Towards Empathetic Human-Robot Interactions,” in 
Computational Linguistics and Intelligent Text Processing, ed. Alexander Gelbukh (New York: Springer 
International Publishing, 2018).  
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noted, to ensure that, “while AI handles the routine optimization tasks, human beings . . . bring 
the personal, creative, and compassionate touch.”39  
Already, public administration experts recognize that this is one of the great potential 
advantages of moving to an automated state. It can free up government workers from drudgery 
and backlogs of files to process, while leaving them more time and opportunities to connect with 
those affected by agency decisions.40 A recent report jointly issued by the Partnership for Public 
Service and the IBM Center for Business and Government explains the importance of this shift 
in what government employees do:  
Many observers who envision greater use of AI in government picture more face-
to-face interactions between agency employees and customers, and additional 
opportunities for more personalized customer services. The shift toward 
employees engaging more with agency customers is expected to be one of several 
possible effects of automating administrative tasks. Relieved of burdensome 
paperwork, immigration officers could spend more time interacting with visa 
applicants or following up on individual immigration cases. Scientists could allot 
more of their day to working with research study participants. And grants 
managers could take more time to learn about and support individual grantees. On 
average, federal employees now spend only 2 percent of their time 
communicating with customers and other people outside their agencies, or less 
than one hour in a workweek, according to one study. At the same time, citizens 
want government to do better. The experiences customers have with companies is 
driving demand for personalized government services. In a survey of more than 
6,000 people from six countries, including the United States, 44 percent of 
respondents identified personalized government services as a priority.41 
 
 
39 Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order (New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt, 2018), 210. 
40 The advent of an automated administrative state will unquestionably lead to changes in the government labor 
force, much as the expanded use of artificial intelligence in the private sector will lead to changes in the labor 
market more generally. David Autor and Anna M. Salomons, “Is Automation Labor-Displacing? Productivity 
Growth, Employment, and the Labor Share,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, March 8, 2018; and David 
Autor, David Mindell, and Elisabeth Reynolds, The Work of the Future: Building Better Jobs in an Age of Intelligent 
Machines (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Work of the Future, 2020), https://workofthefuture.mit.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2021/01/2020-Final-Report4.pdf. The shift to a government workforce increasingly organized 
around empathy harkens to a broader shift from a manufacturing economy to service economy, or perhaps still 
further to a “sharing” economy. See Cary Coglianese, “Optimizing Regulation for an Optimizing Economy,” 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Public Affairs 4 (1) (2018): 3–4.  
41 Partnership for Public Service and IBM Center for the Business of Government, More Than Meets AI, 8. 
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Not only does a substantial portion of the public already recognize the need for empathic, 
personalized engagement opportunities with government, but as private sector organizations 
invest more in personalized services, this will only heighten and broaden expectations for similar 
empathy from government. We already know from extensive research on procedural justice that 
the way that government treats members of the public affects their sense of legitimacy in the 
outcomes they receive.42 To build public trust in an automated state, government authorities will 
need to ensure that members of the public still feel a human connection. As political philosopher 
Amanda Greene has put it, “government must be seen to be sincerely caring about each person’s 
welfare.”43 
 Can administrative law help encourage empathic administrative processes? Some might 
say that this is already a purpose underlying the procedural due process principles that make up 
administrative law. Goldberg v. Kelly, after all, guarantees certain recipients of government 
benefits the right to an oral hearing before a neutral decision-maker prior to the termination of 
their benefits, a right which does afford at least an opportunity for affected individuals to engage 
with a theoretically empathic administrative judge.44 But the now-canonical test of procedural 
due process reflected in Mathews v. Elridge is almost entirely devoid of attention to the role of 
listening, caring, and concern in government’s interactions with members of the public.45 
Mathews defines procedural due process in terms of a balance of three factors: 1) the affected 
private interests, 2) the potential for reducing decision-making error, and 3) the government’s 
interests concerning fiscal and administrative burdens. Machine learning automation would seem 
 
42 Allen E. Lind and Tom Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (New York: Springer International 
Publishing, 1988). 
43 Amanda Greene, “Competence, Fairness, and Caring: The Three Keys to Government Legitimacy,” Centre for 
Public Impact, February 27, 2018, https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/the-three-keys-government-legitimacy/. 
44 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See Lucie E. White, “Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on 
the Hearing of Mrs. G.,” Buffalo Law Review 38 (1) (1990). 
45 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 21 
to pass muster quite easily under the Mathews balancing test. The first factor—the private 
interests at stake—will be external to machine learning, but machine learning systems would 
seem always to fare well under the second and third factors. Their great promise is that they can 
reduce errors and lower administrative costs.  
This is where existing principles of administrative law will fall short in an automated 
state and where the need for greater vision will be needed. Hearing rights and the need for 
reasons are about more than just achieving accurate outcomes, which is what the Mathews 
framework implies. On the contrary, hearings and reason-giving might not be all that good at 
achieving accurate outcomes, at least not as consistently as automated systems. A 2011 study 
showed that among the fifteen most active administrative judges in one office of the Social 
Security Administration, “the judge grant rates . . . ranged . . . from less than 10 percent being 
granted to over 90 percent.”46 The study revealed, for example, that three judges in this same 
office awarded benefits to no more than 30 percent of their applicants, while three other judges 
awarded to more than 70 percent.47 Other studies have suggested that racial disparities may exist 
in Social Security disability awards, with certain Black applicants tending to receive less 
favorable outcomes than White applicants.48 Against this kind of track record, automated 
systems promise distinct advantages when they can be shown to deliver more consistent, fair, 
and even speedy decisions. 
But humans will still be good at listening and empathizing with the predicaments of those 
who are seeking assistance or other decisions from government, or who otherwise find 
 
46 “Social Security Awards Depend More on Judge than Facts,” TRAC Social Security Administration, July 4, 2011, 
https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/ssa/254/. The Social Security Administration sharply disputed aspects of this study.  
47 Ibid. 
48 See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office, “Racial Difference in Disability Decisions Warrants Further 
Investigation,” B-247327 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1992), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/151781.pdf; and Erin M. Godtland, Michele Grgich, Carol Dawn Petersen, et al., 
“Racial Disparities in Federal Disability Benefits,” Contemporary Economic Policy 25 (1) (2007): 27. 
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themselves subjected to its constraints.49 It is that human quality of empathy that should lead the 
administrative law of procedural due process to move beyond just its current emphasis on 
reducing errors and lowering costs.  
To some judges, the need for an administrative law of empathy may lead them to ask 
whether members of the public have a “right to a human decision” within an automated state.50 
But not all human decisions are necessarily empathic ones. Moreover, a right to a human 
decision would bring with it the possibility that the law would accept all the flaws in human 
decision-making simply to retain one of the possible virtues of human engagement. If automated 
decisions turn out increasingly to be more accurate and less biased than human ones, a right to a 
decision by humans would seem to deny the public the desirable improvements in governmental 
performance that algorithms can deliver.  
Administrative law need not stand in the way of these improvements. It can accept the 
use of machine learning algorithms while nevertheless pushing government forward toward 
additional opportunities for listening and compassionate responses.51 Much as the Supreme Court 
in Goldberg v. Kelly insisted on a pretermination hearing for welfare recipients, courts in the 
future can ask whether certain interests are of a sufficient quality and importance to demand that 
 
49 For a discussion of the importance of empathy in the exercise of regulatory authority, see Cary Coglianese, 
Listening, Learning, and Leading: A Framework for Regulatory Excellence (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, 2015), 23–25, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4946-pprfinalconvenersreport.pdf. 
50 For an excellent treatment of this question, see Aziz Z. Huq, “A Right to a Human Decision,” Virginia Law 
Review 106 (3) (2020): 611. 
51 Sometimes the compassionate response may even call for overriding an automated decision: that is, to have a 
human official exhibit mercy and reach a different decision on an individual basis. After all, automated systems 
themselves will still result in errors, and joint human-machine systems may well at times do better to reduce errors 
than either humans or machines operating separately. The challenge, though, will be to ensure enough structure 
around the discretion to override automated outcomes, lest human exceptions come to swallow automated rules. See 
Cary Coglianese, Gabriel Scheffler, and Daniel E. Walters, “Unrules,” Stanford Law Review 73 (2021). One solution 
might be to create automated systems specifically designed to help with this very problem. If an automated system 
generates not only an outcome but also an estimate of confidence in that outcome, humans may be guided to go 
beyond empathic listening and deliver merciful exceptions only in those instances where a system’s estimated 
confidence is sufficiently low.  
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agencies provide supplemental engagement and assistance with individuals subjected to 
automated processes. Courts could in this way seek to reinforce best practices in agency efforts 
to provide empathic outreach and assistance.  
In the end, if administrative law in an automated state is to adopt any new rights, society 
might be better served if courts avoid the recognition of a right to a human decision. Instead, 
courts could consider and seek to define a right to human empathy. 
 
 
 
